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The Relation of the Individual to the State in the Era of Human Rights, 
by Anthony D'Amato*, 24 Texas International Law Journal 1-12 (1989) 
 
Abstract:   I address the question of the relation of the individual to the state and, in so doing, invoke Hegel, the 
preeminent philosopher of relationships. As students of international law, we should look forward to achieving the 
complex synthesis implicit in Hegel's philosophy: to promote the human rights of all persons in the natural context 
of the unique nation in which they live.  Examines a legal problem that highlights this interrelatedness:  Frolova v. 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
 
Tags: International Human Rights, Hegel, Legal Norms, Nationality Relationship (Concept), Frolova v. Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics 
 
 
 [pg1]** I would like to address the question of the relation of the individual to the state 
and, in so doing, invoke Hegel, the preeminent philosopher of relationships. Hegel believed that 
relationships are real and that everything else is a mere consequence of relationships. A few 
years ago, a legal problem confronted me that highlighted this interrelatedness that Hegel 
envisioned. I received a call from a former student that her friend, Lois Frolova, needed advice 
regarding a press conference she wanted to hold. Lois, an American, was going to announce a 
hunger strike that she was committed to endure to the death, if necessary, unless the Soviet 
Union allowed her Soviet husband, Andrei Frolov, to emigrate from Moscow and join Lois in 
Chicago. Andrei and three other "divided spouses" had also recently announced their hunger 
strikes from an apartment in Moscow, and this announcement had been widely reported in the 
press.  
 
 In examining this case, there are several relevant relationships to keep in mind. First is 
the basic spousal relationship between Lois and Andrei.  Next are Lois's relationship with her 
country of nationality, the United States, and Andrei's relationship with his country of 
nationality, the Soviet Union. Finally, there is the relationship between the two countries. There 
are other interesting relationships, such as the attorney-client relationship between Lois and 
myself, but as you will see as we get into this case, the most interesting and complex 
relationship turns out to be that between Lois and the United States.  
 
 The press conference was held the next morning at Northwestern Law School. The 
reporters were taken by Lois's obvious dedication and sincerity, and a major "divided families" 
event was launched.  
 
 [pg2] The next day Lois came to my office, and before we got down to serious business 
I asked her how her parents reacted to the hunger strike. Her father's reaction was that of a 
philosophical absolutist: " Are you out of your mind? Do you think you can change the policy 
of the Soviet Union by threatening suicide? Do you think I’ve spent twenty years raising you so 
that you could come to an end like this for some crazy Russian in Moscow who wants to get out 
of his country?" Her mother's reaction, on the other hand, could be characterized as 
philosophical pragmatism: "Lois, if you must go on a hunger strike, then you must go on a 




 Lois then asked me for my estimate of her chances for success, and I was pessimistic. 
While I was concerned for the couple's health, I felt that Lois's actions and the consequent 
publicity [FN1] would ensure Andrei's personal safety; the Soviet Union probably would not 
arrest or hurt him in full view of the American public. Lois asked if there was anything else she 
could do, and I said that we could explore the matter further if she wanted me to represent her. 
We agreed upon an attorney-client relationship, [FN2] and I said, "You do have legal rights. 
International law clearly states that any person has the right to leave his country for any reason. 
[FN3] And on top of that, there is a growing body of international human rights law regarding 
family reunification. [FN4] Lois was a bright graduate student [FN5] and asked the right 
question, "But is there any way to back up these rights in a court?"  
 
 "Maybe we can sue the Soviet Union directly," I said.  
 
 "I didn't know one could sue the Soviet Union in an international court." "You're right 
as far as that's concerned. Not only isn't the Soviet Union a party to the International Court of 
Justice, [FN6] but even if it were, only states can be plaintiffs in that court, and not individual 
persons. [FN7] 
 
 "Then what?"  
 
 "A federal court here in Chicago might be a possibility. But the real problem is that we 
couldn't even get the case started without serving the Soviet Union, and [pg3] they would have 
sixty days to answer service of process. [FN8] Lois confirmed that no one could hold out on a 
hunger strike that long.  
 
 After Lois left my office, I researched the possibility of an injunction and discussed 
general strategy with my colleague Steven Lubet and a practicing attorney, Luis Kutner. A suit 
for an injunction can be commenced without formal service of process; if time is of the essence, 
simple notification will suffice.[FN9] We could limit the injunction to Chicago, asking the 
court to bar all Soviet sales of gold and purchases of wheat on the Chicago commodities 
markets until Andrei was given permission to emigrate. 
  
 We marshaled numerous treaties and other international instruments in support of the 
injunction, including the United Nations Charter, [FN10] the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights [FN11] and the Helsinki Accords. [FN12] I also included provisions of the Soviet 
Constitution that recognize the central importance of the family.[FN13] We sent a telegram to 
the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., notifying the Soviet officials that a motion had been 
filed in federal court for a temporary restraining order prohibiting Soviet sales of gold and 
purchases of wheat on the Chicago commodities markets. I was unsure, however, whether this 
would galvanize the embassy into action. The officials might simply ignore the telegram. Or, 
more likely, the Soviet government would request the United States to intervene and ask the 
district judge to dismiss the motion. The Department of State and the Department of Justice 
have been quite active in recent years in intervening on behalf of foreign sovereigns to oppose 




 Our twin goals of bringing home the importance of the injunction to the Soviet Union 
and keeping the United States government from intervening on behalf of the Soviet Union 
could possibly be accomplished if the United States could be joined as a co-plaintiff in the 
litigation against the Soviet Union. The problem, however, was that the United States 
government could certainly not be induced to join Lois on her side of the lawsuit. So we 
resorted to a little-known rule of federal civil procedure [FN15] to bring the United States in as 
a necessary co-plaintiff and, accordingly, served the United States with a copy of the complaint 
listing the United States as co-plaintiff. 
  
 But the critical strategies in the case had much more to do with relationships than with 
marshaling legal authority and procedure. We joined the United States as a party because of the 
conception of the nationality relationship under classical [pg4] international law: an individual 
lacks standing to sue a state under traditional theory and, hence, when an individual has a 
grievance against a foreign state, only the individual's state of nationality can bring the claim. 
[FN16] Under this view, the United States could "espouse" the claim of its national, Lois 
Frolova, against the Soviet Union. If the United States chose not to espouse Lois's claim, under 
traditional international law—and perhaps under more modern conceptions as well—there was 
no international norm that would compel it to do so. Nationality is thus a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition of the "espousal" doctrine. On this point, I turned to United States law. I 
argued that Lois had a due process right under the United States Constitution to compel the 
United States to assert and attempt to vindicate her international human right to live with her 
husband. 
 
 This piece of litigation strategy appeared to produce the desired effect. First, we had 
started a lawsuit between the two countries in a Chicago court, and that in itself was sure to 
bring Lois and Andrei's plight to the attention of the leadership in Moscow. Second, by placing 
the Soviet Union and the United States on opposite sides of a lawsuit that neither nation 
wanted, we hoped that a diplomatic conversation would ensue between the two countries in 
which we could expect the United States to suggest that the best way out of the mess would be 
for the Soviet Union simply to let Andrei emigrate. Third, the United States, suddenly faced 
with a novel set of questions under the necessary co-plaintiff procedure, was diverted from 
intervening on behalf of the Soviet Union by being forced to expend its legal energies on 
resisting our attempt to bring it into the case as a co-plaintiff. The net result was that the United 
States was not a threat to Lois's case for a few days—and, considering the hunger strike, a few 
days were all that we had. [FN17] 
 
 Only five days after our telegram was delivered to the Soviet embassy in Washington, 
the Soviet secret police visited Andrei Frolov in Moscow and told him that he could leave the 
country. [FN18] Since we had received corroboration through a reporter for the Chicago 
Tribune that Andrei would not meet with any bureaucratic obstacles in getting out of the Soviet 
Union,  the United States role as a necessary co-plaintiff arguably was over. Indeed, if Lois 
later decided to pursue the case against the Soviet Union for monetary damages, having the 
United States involved in the case on her side might be awkward. Under classical international 
law theory, any monetary damages would be paid to the nation espousing its national's claim 
and not to the individual. In such a situation, Lois might be stuck with the additional problem of 
suing the United States to retrieve any damages paid by the Soviet Union to the United States. 
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So when the attorney [pg5] for the Department of Justice showed up in court to argue its motion 
for dismissal as a co-plaintiff, I simply informed the court that I consented. [FN19] 
 
 It took Andrei Frolov almost a month to get all of his exit papers in order, but he duly 
arrived in the United States. The Chicago Tribune headlined the event "From Russia with 
Love."  
 
 I was criticized in some quarters for using manipulative legal tactics against the Soviet 
Union, both in asking for an injunction and in joining the United States as a necessary co-
plaintiff. Some thought it was frivolous [FN20] to play on the Soviets' lack of knowledge of 
American courts and their consequent fear that I might possibly get an injunction against their 
gold sales and wheat purchases. I think that those who say it was a manipulation of the legal 
system are implicitly adopting the perspective that nations are the entities of primary concern 
and that law is meant to serve national interests. My own perspective is quite different; I believe 
that what counts are the rights of human beings and the primacy of the individual human 
personality. If there were no nations in the world, Lois and Andrei would naturally have the 
right to live together in the place of their choosing. We may superimpose national borders on 
the world, but I don't see how that changes their basic right. Nations themselves, although only 
recently, have conceded that any person has the right to emigrate from his country and that a 
married couple has the right to live together in any country they choose. I see nothing wrong in 
deconstructing a legal system to the extent that it places and maintains barriers between a 
husband and wife who want to live together. On the contrary, I would argue that those who feel 
that I manipulated the legal system to help Lois and Andrei have themselves been manipulated 
by the legal superstructure into believing that people are subordinate to abstractions. 
  
 Hegel believed that persons create legal norms as rules for their interactions with other 
persons. Unlike the legal positivists [FN21] who see law as emanating from the legislature at 
the top and commanding individuals at the bottom, Hegel saw law arising from the bottom, out 
of the everyday interactions of persons. In this way, persons continuously fill and refill the 
world with the rights they have created. [FN22] Persons can be expected to obey a legal norm 
only if they have participated in the process of creating that norm. This notion indeed seems 
strange to most lawyers who deal with national legal systems, but it is familiar as a description 
of customary law to those who study international law. 
 
 [pg6] What are the roles of legislatures and courts in Hegel's philosophy? To Hegel, 
legislation is external to the lawmaking process; it is a kind of intrusion into that process, and 
the legislator is an outsider commanding you to do that which mayor may not be in your 
interest or in the interest of persons with whom you interact.  
 
 Courts, for Hegel, are subordinate and incidental to human interaction. [FN23] Courts 
simply recognize norms that people have created. A judicial precedent is, therefore, not itself a 
source of law, but rather a way of recognizing the rule-creating and rule-articulating effect of 
previous personal interactions. Even when a court cites a rule in its opinion, the rule is not law 




 Jeremy Bentham's positivism, on the other hand, is the antithesis of Hegel's view. 
[FN24] Bentham was an enthusiastic supporter of overactive legislatures, indeed of 
comprehensive civil codes. He wanted written rules to govern every aspect of your life. As 
Arthur Jacobson has noted,  positivism effectively strives to eliminate personality from the law. 
[FN25]  Positivism treats us as the objects of legislative commands rather than as the sources of 
law, and hence dehumanizes us by subjecting us to a sort of dictatorship of external law. FN26]  
And positivism is the reigning notion of law in the world today. It is at the root of the 
philosophies of those who want to “protect" legal systems against the human rights claims of 
individuals who challenge the structure of a given system.  
 
 A healthy dose of the study of international law is a good antidote to this prevailing 
positivist vision. International customary law develops from the bottom up. Through their 
interactions, nations both create and enforce the evolving norms of custom. [FN27] Yet the 
analogy between international customary law and Hegel's view of law is too easy; simply 
substituting "nation" for "person" in Hegel's philosophy leads to the reification of nations. 
Although Hegel himself was on occasion guilty of such a substitution, and although he has been 
thought of as the philosopher whose personification of the state was a precursor of Nazism, 
[FN28] I want to make the harder argument that the personification of the state is an outgrowth 
of Bentham's, not of Hegel's, philosophy. It was Jeremy Bentham who in 1789 helped fashion 
the term "international law" to mean what it does today. [FN29] It was Bentham who looked 
upon the state as a legal and juristic institution, and it was his positivist view that assumed 
international law to be [pg7] about the rights and duties of states per se, and not about the rights 
and duties of individuals. [FN30] Accordingly, I shall argue that, despite those aspects of 
Hegel's philosophy that have led some interpreters to say he apotheosized the state, a closer 
look at Hegel's philosophy reveals a more subtle and complex picture. 
 
 Let us consider three possible ways of looking at a state (Hegel was fond of 
trichotomies); transparent, translucent, and opaque. These words are, of course, very ordinary 
and no special significance should be attached to them. [FN31] A state is opaque under the 
view that I have attributed to Jeremy Bentham. [FN32] In his philosophy, the state has standing 
in international law and Lois is not recognized at all; we would see only the United States and 
could not look through it to see Lois. In Lois's case, it would be not her but the United States 
that was damaged by the Soviet Union's violation of international law in refusing to let Andrei 
Frolov emigrate. Hence, if the United States were to have sued the Soviet Union and won, 
international law would not require that the United States pay to Lois any monetary damages 
that it might have collected as a result of the lawsuit.  
 
 Many advocates of international human rights, on the other hand, view the state as 
utterly transparent, believing that the state is a completely artificial construct; it really does not 
exist in any meaningful sense. [FN33] The only thing of significance in the world is people. 
People have problems. People can be hurt. People have rights. Any claim that states have 
separate rights puts a mask on the rights of people within those states and is apt to divert our 
attention from the legitimate rights of persons. 
 
 I believe that neither of these polar views is consistent with Hegel's philosophy. While 
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I am not sure that he would have liked the term, I think Hegel's view of the state is that it is in 
some sense translucent. The people in the state do not constitute and cannot claim the totality of 
the rights in the state; this is partly because the state also incorporates rights of people who have 
lived in the past and people who will live in the future, and partly because the mere sum of the 
individuals in the state does not fully account for the way those people behave. To some extent, 
people behave as they do because of the state's particular configuration. As Hegel said, 
 
The State, its laws, its arrangements, constitute the rights of its members; its natural 
features, its mountains, air, and waters, are their country, their fatherland, their outward 
material property; the history of this State, their deeds; what their ancestors have 
produced, belongs to them and lives in their memory. All is their possession, just as they 
are possessed by it; for it constitutes their existence, their being. [FN34] 
 
[pg8] In prosaic terms, the state is more than the sum of its parts. In representing the individuals 
within it, the state is in a sense effectuating their moral position in the international community. 
Their moral position, in turn, is not the sum of the moral positions of the individuals in the 
state, but rather what those persons, their ancestors, and their future generations ought to desire 
and have a right to desire. In a sense the state is the physical manifestation of the collective 
rights of the people who have lived in it, who are living in it, and who will be born within its 
territory. 
 
 There is a danger that this translucent view of the state can lead to nationalism and 
national chauvinism. Governments and leaders may be quick to suggest that they know better 
than the people what is in the interest of the state, [FN35] and they can rally the people behind 
them by engaging in adventures abroad. But while the Hegelian position can lead to 
nationalism, it does not necessarily point in that direction; especially if we consider the 
Hegelian view in the context of international law, we find that it suggests some interesting and 
not intuitively obvious legal positions. 
 
 Of the many examples I could choose, let me pick three cases of United States military 
intervention: Vietnam, Grenada, and Nicaragua. The United States went into Vietnam to fill the 
power gap left after the French withdrew from Indo-China following their defeat at Dien Bien 
Phu in 1954. The United States's avowed purpose was to prevent the spread of communism. 
The realization of this goal, however, required supporting the corrupt slumlords of Saigon in 
their fight against the indigenous revolutionary movement of the Viet Congo The result was the 
longest war in United States history, and one that we eventually lost. In the aftermath of our 
withdrawal, the massive genocide in Cambodia took thousands of lives.  
 
 Quite different was our intervention in Grenada. A military group had machine-gunned 
its way into control, killing the leaders of the democratic government. The United States 
intervened, restored the democratic government, and then withdrew.  
 
 The Nicaraguan intervention was similar in some respects to both of these cases and 
dissimilar in others. At first, the United States applauded the ascension to power of the 
Sandinista government, but as it showed signs of becoming a leftist political dictatorship 
(suppressing opposition newspapers and rigging elections, among other things), the United 
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States shifted its support to the Contras. But the Contras did not represent a democratic 
movement; not only did they lack [pg9] indigenous support, they also tortured and murdered 
defenseless Nicaraguan citizens. Support for the Reagan administration's Nicaraguan policy 
waned when the American public became aware of the brutal human rights violations by the 
Contras.  
 
 In analyzing these three cases, we should begin with the obvious but often unnoticed 
proposition that in none of the interventions was annexation a goal of the United States. [FN36] 
This in itself is historically remarkable. Up through the nineteenth century, a vastly superior 
military power that intervened in a foreign country was almost certain to annex it and transform 
it either into a colony or a protectorate. To be sure, our foreign policy purpose might have been 
akin to the nineteenth century notion of "balance of power" politics. [FN37] Many political and 
military thinkers have indeed conceived of our foreign policy in these terms. [FN38] But this 
can only be rhetoric designed for domestic public relations, for in our overstock-piled nuclear 
age, when we can destroy any foreign country by pressing buttons, neither the United States nor 
the Soviet Union has any strategic military need for third-world allies, nor any need to redress 
insignificant imbalances among other nations. 
  
 Ultimately, the United States respected the nationhood of Vietnam, Grenada, and 
Nicaragua by not trying to impose upon them permanently its political control. But how should 
we assess the United States posture toward these countries in terms of opacity, translucency, 
and transparency? The Vietnam situation was one in which the United States regarded Vietnam 
as opaque. The United States considered the Saigon military dictatorship to be the sole legal 
voice of the state and refused to concern itself with the "democratic" aspirations of the people 
of that unfortunate country. A position based on the notion of the translucent state would have 
dictated that, if we had to intervene at all—and whether or not we should have is not a question 
that I am addressing here—we should have helped the Viet Cong establish a democratic, even if 
leftist, government to correspond with the wishes of the Vietnamese people. [FN39] 
 
 Grenada was, I believe, a paradigm of the Hegelian translucent position. The United 
States intervened on behalf of the Grenadians who otherwise would have [pg10] been at the 
mercy of the small group of murderers who usurped power.  After restoring the democratic 
structure of the state, United States military forces left. [FN40] The United States position 
might be characterized as supporting the nation of Grenada for the people of Grenada to enjoy, 
and opposing the capture of that nation by a group of thugs who would have established an 
authoritarian dictatorship against the wishes of the people.  
 
 This brings me to the most difficult case—Nicaragua. If the new Sandinista government 
were going to do the same thing as the thugs who temporarily took over Grenada, but over a 
few years' time, then I think the United States would have a prima facie case for intervening on 
behalf of the people of Nicaragua. Moreover, the time for intervention in such cases must be 
before the new government has consolidated its power, destroyed opposing political parties, 
abolished elections, and put opposition newspapers out of business. Intervention on behalf of 
the people of Nicaragua against the gradual movement toward totalitarianism of the new 
government was, therefore, a policy that had to be set in motion before all the evidence was in 




 But the problem in Nicaragua was that the United States could not find an opposition 
movement that represented the wishes of the people. The Contras, whom the United States 
government backed, were led by deposed officers of the previous Somoza dictatorship; Unlike 
Castro, who in his guerilla campaign in the hills of Cuba enjoyed the overwhelming support of 
the villagers, the Contras in Nicaragua have never had such indigenous support and have turned 
instead to the arbitrary murder and torture of the citizenry in order to "prove" to them that the 
existing government is powerless to protect its people and that, therefore, they should support 
the Contras. Few citizens have been won over by these desperate tactics.  
 
 The failure to find an indigenous movement antithetical to the Sandinista government 
should have signaled to the Reagan administration that the Sandinistas indeed had popular 
support, and that perhaps it was United States support of the Contras rather than widespread 
domestic resistance to the new government that was pushing the Sandinistas toward 
suppression of civil liberties. (In any dangerous military situation, any government, including 
democratic governments, will curtail the freedoms of the citizenry.)  
 
 Some highly traditionalist writers on international law would agree that the United 
States should not have supported the Contras or mined Nicaragua's harbors, but for the reason 
that no transboundary use of military force is acceptable. Their position is echoed by many 
leaders of third-world nations who proclaim publicly that under no circumstances should the 
superpowers intervene in the internal affairs of any nation. These officials take an opaque view 
of nations as entities on the international scene and cite article 2(4) to back their position. But I 
think we should regard their position as self-serving. Obviously, these [pg11] third-world 
leaders want to be secure in their home countries against all external intervention, especially the 
kind that would establish a democratic government and maybe remove them from office in the 
process. These leaders do not necessarily represent the legitimate aspirations of their people. 
 
 Furthermore, I think we should always be skeptical about any legal argument that 
categorically prohibits the use of force, because some uses of force are clearly required in order 
to protect people against brutality and degradation. If you are walking down a street and 
someone assaults you, you would expect a nearby police officer to intervene on your behalf. 
You would expect the police officer to use force if necessary. Or consider a case that is more 
closely analogous to a nation: Suppose you walk by a house and see through the window a man 
savagely beating a woman. Even if they are husband and wife, and even if they are in their own 
house and on private property, you would have a moral obligation to call the police and would 
expect the police to intervene. If the police were not available, you would have a moral right to 
intervene personally. Why should the situation in the house be any different from the situation 
within a nation? If the government kidnaps or "disappears" citizens, and continues to do so as a 
policy, why should that government be immune from outside military intervention? Such a 
government has no moral claim to be left alone to work its arbitrary will upon the people. 
 
 Certainly, if there were a multilateral police force operant in the world today, that 
force—and not any individual nation acting unilaterally—would be the proper agent to engage 
in these humanitarian interventions. But there is no such force. In its absence, nations do 
engage from time to time in humanitarian intervention, [FN41] and I suggest that the 
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intervention is legal under international law if the use of military force itself is not expected to 
cause greater suffering or loss of life than that caused by those violations of human rights that it 
is attempting to remedy. 
 
 In short, what goes on in another country should no longer be obscured by an opaque 
view of the state.  International morality, in the form of humanitarian intervention, has caught 
up with international law. Of course, intervention cannot end in annexation or colonization and 
must be terminated when the evil has been remedied, but the practice of states is now telling us 
that, within these parameters, governments are no longer insulated from the international legal 
community if they brutalize their own citizenry. In other words, states should be thought of as 
translucent entities.  
 
 Returning to Lois Frolova's case, I would have preferred to see the United States 
welcome, not fight, the opportunity to join us as co-plaintiff.  But the United States is still a 
long way from supporting the private enforcement of international human rights, even in its 
own courts. Rather, the government prefers to monopolize all foreign affairs matters and settle 
them, if at all, on a political basis. Unfortunately, the notion of deregulation and smaller 
government, [pg12] although embraced domestically, is far from being actualized in the 
conduct of United States foreign policy. [FN42] 
 
 Looking ahead, I hope that the new and exciting human rights cases that some American 
lawyers are initiating in United States courts will help educate our own government as to the 
proper translucency of our own country .Our government should make every effort to assist its 
citizens in the assertion of their international human rights. These assertions should become 
part of what this country stands for. Foreign policy should not be decided solely in Washington, 
D.C., but rather should be an expression of the legitimate aspirations of all the people, as at 
least some of these aspirations are articulated in our own court system. And we should 
welcome, not resist, similar human rights cases being filed in the courts of other nations. Courts 
throughout the world can be a forum in which people can assert the primacy of their human 
rights, in all situations in which states are impeding the realization of those rights. The United 
States should welcome this trend and not, by adherence to a principle of the opacity of a state, 
resist it on the grounds of, 'sovereignty.' 
 
 If we reject the state as either opaque or transparent, we are rejecting simplistic 
approaches and embarking instead on a new vision, albeit one of great complexity. The rules of 
international law will not seem nearly as clear as they were in the past. The intellectual 
challenge to students who want to begin a career in international law will be much greater than 
it was to past generations. But as students of international law, we should look forward to 
achieving the complex synthesis implicit in Hegel's philosophy: to promote the human rights of 
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[FN1] The Chicago coverage soon was picked up nationally, and in a few days Lois was on 
ABC's Nightline  program. Nightline (ABC television broadcast, May 17, 1982). 
 
[FN2]. The arrangement was on a pro bono basis, with Lois paying out-of-pocket expenses and 
court filing fees. 
 
[FN3] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13(1), (2), GA Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR at 
71, U.N. Doc. A/810  (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12, G.A. 
Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16)  at 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
 
[FN4] Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act [hereinafter Helsinki 
Accords], 73 DEPT. ST.  BULL. 323 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1293 (1975). 
 
[FN5] She later received her Ph.D. from Stanford; her thesis was on nineteenth century Russian  
liberalism. 
 
[FN6]. The U.S.S.R. has not consented to compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. 1983-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. I, 38-42, 46 (1985). 
 
[FN7] Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,1945, art.34, para. 1, 59 Stat. 
1055,T. S. No.993. It would have been superfluous to tell Lois that, in theory, the United States 
could espouse her claim and bring an action in the International Court of Justice. See infra text 
accompanying note 16. Not only would it take months to bring the argument before the State 
Department, but there would be practically no chance that the State Department could be 
convinced. 
 
[FN8] 28 U.S.C. § 1608(d) (1982). 
 
[FN9] FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(1).  
 
[FN10] U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56.  
 




[FN12] Helsinki Accords, supra note 4, at 340. 
 
[FN13] See, e.g., KONSTITUTSIYA SSSR [KONST. SSSR] arts. 35, 53 (USSR), translated in 17 
A. BLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 26, 29 (1972). 
 
[FN14] See, e.g., Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 107 S. Ct. 2178 (1987); Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, No.82-1772, slip op. (C.D.  
Cal. Sept. 28, 1984). 
 
[FN15] FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). 
 
[FN16] See R. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 65, 175-94 (1986). 
 
[FN17] As an aside, the publicity finally penetrated all the way to the dean's office of 
Northwestern Law School. Dean David Ruder stopped me in the hall and asked, "What's this 
about a hunger strike that somebody is conducting in your office?" He must have thought that it 
was a kind of sit-in or other illegal activity. I replied that Lois Frolova, my client, was 
conducting a hunger strike wherever she went, and that included my office. I said with a smile 
that the hunger strike had little choice but to follow her around. 
 
[FN18] He was the only one of the four hunger strikers in the Moscow apartment who was 
allowed to leave. Two of the others eventually abandoned their strike, and a third was 
hospitalized.  
 
[FN19] The eventual lawsuit for damages was dismissed in district court on the act of state 
doctrine, and the dismissal was affirmed in the court of appeals on entirely different grounds 
(sovereign immunity). Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. 
Ill. 1983), affd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 
[FN20] Oliver, Book Review, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 445, 446 (1987); see also Letter from Burns H. 
Weston and Clarification by Covey T. Oliver, reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 635-37 (1987). 
 
[FN21] Legal positivism is the belief that the validity of law is not affected by moral or ethical 
values;  morals do not enter into the definition of law. 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
418-20 (1972); D'AMATO, The Moral Dilemma of Positivism, 20 VAL. U .L. REV. 43 (1985). 
 
[FN22] A. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 877 (1988-1989)  
 
[FN23]. T. KNOX, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 141 (1942).  
 
[FN24] One writer summarized Bentham's view as follows: "Rights proceed from laws, and 
laws from government: men living without government live without rights." E. KAYSER,  THE 
GRAND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 38 (1932).  
 




[FN26] See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
8-9 (J. Burns & L. Hart eds. 1970).  
 
[FN27] I considered at some length the creational aspect of international customary law in A. 
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 104-66 (1971), and the 
enforcement aspect in A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT  27-55 
(1987); see also Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of International Law, 78 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 405, 409 (1984). 
 
[FN28] K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 226-73 (1950). 
 
[FN29] See J. BENTHAM, supra note 26, at 297-98; Janis, supra note 27, at 405. 
 
[FN30] Janis, supra note 27, at 409. 
 
[FN31] Indeed, I choose them because they do not come to us already weighted with 
significance. Other writers have used terms such as "transnationalism," "realism," "utopianism," 
and "cosmopolitanism," but I think these terms are less successful in conveying accuracy of 
meaning. See, e.g., T. NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 98, 101-02 
(1983). 
 
[FN32] The Benthamite view was translated most thoroughly into international law by the 
supremely influential treatise of Lassa Oppenheim. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th 
ed. 1955).  
 
[FN33] See Elfstrom, On Dilemmas Of Intervention, 93 ETHICS 709, 713 (1983). 
 
[FN34] G.W.F. HEGEL, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 406 (Loewenberg ed. 
1929)  (emphasis in original). 
 
[FN35] Rousseau, for example, considered this view carefully. J.-J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT 131-34 (M. Cranston trans. 1968). On a superficial reading, Rousseau's "general 
will" can be that which is asserted by a totalitarian government and ratified by overwhelming 
plebiscite; we are familiar with the uses to which Hitler and Mussolini put this "general will." 
On a deeper reading, Rousseau's philosophy has to be considered in light of the great 
international lawyers, especially Grotius and Pufendorf, whom he had read and to whom he was 
reacting. Rousseau's "general will" turns out to reflect natural law, which (in his theory) is not 
easily manipulated by charismatic leaders. What is most obviously missing from Rousseau is 
the element later supplied by Hegel: the configuration of the state itself as a physical 
manifestation of the rights (the general will in the natural-law sense) of the people 
 
[FN36] By neither annexing nor colonizing the three nations, the United States arguably did not 
violate article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of another country. Of course, other writers have 
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looked at the language of article 2(4) and concluded the opposite. My purpose here, however, is 
not to engage in traditional legal analysis. 
 
[FN37] For an informative discourse on balance of power politics, see E. STOWELL, 
INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 414-31 (1921). 
 
[FN38] In particular, Henry Kissinger has emphasized the Metternich approach in his many 
books and papers contemporary with the Vietnam intervention. 
 
[FN39]. There is no evidence that a leftist popular revolution would necessarily lead to control 
by an external power such as the Soviet Union. Certainly China—for all its radical communism 
under Mao—remained steadfastly independent of Moscow. The lesson of  China, however, may 
not have been perceived in the mid-1960s when the United States began escalating its military 
commitment in Vietnam. But even apart from these considerations, any revolutionary 
movement in Vietnam that reflected the aspirations of the majority of the people would by 
definition have to be "leftist," since the Saigon government was an extreme rightist dictatorship. 
 
[FN40] I said at the time that I thought that, irrespective of our avowed purpose, our real 
purpose was humanitarian and fully consistent with international law. D'Amato, Intervention in 
Grenada: Right or Wrong? N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at E18, col. 3. 
 
[FN41]. For a collection and excellent discussion of intervention cases, see F. TESON, 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 155-200 (1987). 
 
[FN42] See D'Amato, International Human Rights at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 22 
INT'L LAW. 167 (1988).  Of course, I would argue that Lois's case is not "foreign policy" at all, 
but rather a matter of private human rights. The United States should intervene in the lawsuit 
only because Lois asserted a clear human-rights claim; "political" reasons should not count 
either way.  Moreover, it's a two-way street; we should expect, and indeed encourage, lawsuits 
against our country in Soviet courts by Soviet citizens, with the Soviet government intervening 
on their behalf.  Our "protection" against such lawsuits is simply the fact that we do not, and 
should not, commit human-rights violations such as refusing to allow any person to leave this 
country to live with his or her spouse in the Soviet Union.  
 
 
